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Abstract: The available road space (the scarce resource) is currently allocated by
one’s willingness to sit in traffic jams. The costs incurred in sitting in traffic jams
benefits no one – it is pure deadweight loss. The solution is to get the motorist to
pay the social cost (marginal congestion cost). By pricing the cost of this traffic
congestion in euro, this money could be collected and put to good use, perhaps
on improving public transport.

An economics professor at UCD used tell us that the problem
with economic theory is that people keep ignoring it.
Applying economic theory as a resolution to the problem of
road congestion is a case in point. In 1776 Adam Smith
published his classic, An inquiry into the nature and causes of
the wealth of nations, which argued that individuals, left to
follow their own self interest will do what is best for them
and indirectly what’s best for society.
The food we eat, the clothes we wear and the roofs over our
heads don’t simply appear because the food producers,
tailors and builders are altruistic, kind, caring and
thoughtful human beings. They appear because people are
motivated to make profits.
However, in pursuing their own self-interests they
unintentionally serve the public interest. It is as if they are
guided by an “invisible hand” to promote (involuntarily) a
public interest.
Adam Smith’s idea of an invisible hand that connects private
interests is at the heart of understanding political economy.
Markets and market prices are more often than not the best
way to organize economic activity and allocate scarce
resources.

However, even Adam Smith would acknowledge that
sometimes markets don’t always promote the public interest
and that governments need to intervene. One reason for
market failure is what economists refer to as externalities –
the effect that market activity has on the wellbeing of
bystanders.
A factory that doesn’t have to pay the cost of polluting the air
is likely to produce too much and therefore pollute too
much. The social costs of pollution are not included with the
private costs (wages, rent, materials etc.) in the price of the
product. In this case intervention is necessary to correct the
market failure.
Similarly, motorists will make a decision whether to take a
particular journey based on the benefits of the journey and
the costs (time spent travelling, petrol etc.). What they don’t
consider is the additional costs they impose on others as a
result of their decision to take that journey – they increased
congestion.
The available road space (the scarce resource) is currently
allocated by one’s willingness to sit in traffic jams. The costs
incurred in sitting in traffic jams benefits no one – it is pure
deadweight loss. The solution is to get the motorist to pay
the social cost (marginal congestion cost). By pricing eh cost
of this traffic congestion in euro, this money could be
collected and put to good use, perhaps on improving public
transport.
An argument put forward against road pricing is that roads
are a public good and therefore considered “free”. However,
roads cease to be a public good once they become congested
and instead become a common resource. When a road
becomes congested, one person’s use of the road reduces the
available space for other users.
It is difficult to charge road users for the space that they use
up. Receiving the benefits of something without paying for it
(including the social costs) is an example in economics of the
free-rider problem. The problem for policy makers is to
decide how much should a common resource should be

used. Avoiding congestion would involve the co-operation
of all motorists.
They could act together to reduce the number of cars on the
road to a level that is efficient, i.e, to a level that would
eliminate congestion. The problem is that each motorist
does not have the incentive to co-operate because each
individual motorist contributes only a small proportion of
the congestion problem. In economics this is the classic case
of the tragedy of the commons’.
To avoid this tragedy, policy makers could increase the price
of complementary goods, e.g. petrol taxes. Petrol is
considered a complementary good because cars cannot
operate without petrol. By raising the price of petrol (via
taxation) this reduces the demand for driving. But car
ownership is, in economic jargon, a very inelastic good.
Demand for driving is very insensitive to price. Therefore
the fall in demand induced by petrol taxation is likely to be
insignificant. In addition the problem is with peak demand.
Congestion usually happens at peak times in the mornings
and evenings. But this type of variation in demand is not a
problem. Petrol tax cannot be used to solve congestion
problems – buying petrol during off-peak times can be used
during peak periods.
Urban planners and policymakers spend an inordinate
amount of money, time and resources trying to find
solutions to traffic congestion (top-down policies). Often
without reference to how market pricing can be used to
eliminate congestion.
Planners must surely realize that “supply-induced polices”
(building more roads) has clearly failed to solve the twin
problems of congestion and pollution. Building more roads
simply leads to – drum roll – more cars. Knocking down all
the buildings in Dublin and building roads would not
eliminate traffic congestion.
Road pricing works in theory and practice. Singapore, the
first city in the world to introduce road pricing has no
congestion problems and no traffic-induced pollution

problems. London’s experience has been a monumental
success. There are fewer cars in the city, lower CO2
emissions and higher levels of business transactions.
Fellow egalitarians who oppose road pricing on the basis
that it is regressive and that the “right” to drive should be
distributed equally and not just based on one’s income
should remember that road congestion is unfair to
everybody not just to those who use the roads. However,
since it is the case that higher income groups tend to drive
more and use bigger cars than lower income groups, car
owners could be given a driving permit that would give
them a driving time each year. For those who drive less or
decide not to travel into congested areas they could sell their
balance to those who are willing and able to buy them – a
distribution of income from rich to poor.

